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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff does not dispute the nature of the case as 
set forth in defendant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the record adequately supported the trial 
court's Finding of Fact that Donna Hagblom, an employee of the 
defendant, was not required by plaintiff to return to him any 
portion of bonuses she had received from the defendant. 
2. Whether the trial court committed error in 
determining that, as a matter of law, plaintiff's actions in 
requesting two of defendant's maintenance men to provide main-
tenance services on his residence while they were on duty for 
the defendant were not acts of moral turpitude or unethical 
conduct. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 5, 1980, plaintiff and defendant executed 
an Employment Agreement under which plaintiff agreed to be 
defendant's Club Manager. The conditions of plaintiff's 
employment, including the obligations of both plaintiff and 
defendant, were outlined in the Employment Agreement. Findings 
of Fact, 1f 3, R. 104; Ex. D-l, R. 6-8. 
The Employment Agreement, at paragraph 1(f), sets 
forth the conditions under which defendant could terminate the 
plaintiff, and in what instances defendant was obligated to pay 
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plaintiff liquidated damages subsequent to the termination: 
If, in the judgment of the Board of Direc-
tors of Employer [defendant], Manager 
[plaintiff] fails to perform any of his 
obligations or duties hereunder, and the 
Board of Directors determines that the 
conduct of the Manager is unethical, 
involves gross negligence or a breach of 
moral turpitude, this Contract shall term-
inate at the option of the Employer upon 
thirty (30) days notice to the Manager. In 
the event, however, the Employer shall wish 
to terminate this Contract without suffi-
cient cause or reason, Employer shall pay 
Manager one-third (1/3) of one-year's salary 
as liquidated damages, (emphasis added) 
R.7. On January 23, 1983, defendant terminated the plaintiff. 
At the time of his termination, his salary was $41,400.00. 
Findings of Fact, 1fir 4-5, R. 104. 
Prior to the trial of this matter, the defendant 
alleged that plaintiff engaged in certain acts that were either 
unethical or were acts of moral turpitude. Accordingly, 
defendant asserted plaintiff was not entitled to 
post-termination liquidated damages under the Employment 
Agreement. Defendant alleged that: 
1. Plaintiff wrote checks on defendant's account to 
one of defendant's employees, Jeanette Wilhelm, from which 
checks plaintiff did not deduct Federal and State taxes and 
FICA monies; 
2. Plaintiff wrote checks on defendant's account to 
Bruce R. Hewitt, but Hewitt was not employed by the defendant 
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at the time; 
3. Plaintiff wrote checks on defendant's account to 
Frank Rotunno without defendant's authorization, which checks 
compensated Rotunno for living expenses and travel expenses; 
4. Plaintiff wrote bonus checks on defendant's 
account to Donna Hagblom and Frank Rotunno, and required them 
to pay him certain amounts from those bonus checks as a cash 
kickback; and 
5. Plaintiff required Kevin Stewart and Stephen 
Draper, both maintenance men employed by the defendant, to 
provide maintenance services to him at his residence while 
these employees were on duty for defendant. Defendant's 
Counterclaim, 1f1f 3-5, R. 12-13; Defendant's Answers to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, 1M[ 3-7, R. 26-28. 
After hearing the testimony of the witnesses for both 
sides, the trial court found that none of defendant's allega-
tions against the plaintiff had any merit except that 
maintenance services had been provided to the plaintiff at his 
residence and at his request by defendant's maintenance men. 
The court found that Jeanette Wilhelm had been hired by the 
plaintiff as an independent contractor pursuant to plaintiff's 
authority under the Employment Contract, and that because of 
her status as an independent contractor, plaintiff did not have 
to withhold Federal or State taxes or FICA monies from her 
-3-
checks. The court found that of the two checks plaintiff wrote 
to Bruce R. Hewitt, one was Hewitt's Christmas bonus (he had 
been an employee of the defendant earlier that year). The 
second check was actually compensation for services provided by 
Jeanette Wilhelm, but at her request, the plaintiff wrote the 
check out to Hewitt. The court further found that the checks 
plaintiff wrote to Frank Rotunno for living and travel expenses 
were authorized by Willowcreek Country Club board member Jerry 
Butterfield, and that the payment of similar expenses, under 
similar circumstances, had been authorized by the defendant in 
the past for both Rotunno and the plaintiff. Finally, the 
court found that plaintiff did not require either Donna Hagblom 
or Frank Rotunno to return any monies from any bonus checks 
that the plaintiff wrote to those individuals. Findings of 
Fact, W 14-17, R. 106-108. 
The court did find that Kevin Stewart and Stephen 
Draper provided maintenance services at plaintiff's request 
upon his residence while they were on duty at Willowcreek 
Country Club. The court found specifically that Stewart pro-
vided approximately 12 hours worth of housecleaning services to 
the plaintiff, for which the plaintiff occasionally paid him. 
The court also found that Draper spent 2 hours one afternoon 
servicing plaintiff's evaporative ("swamp") cooler. Findings 
of Fact, 1f1f 11 and 13, R. 105-106. The court then concluded as 
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a matter of law that plaintiff's requests for the maintenance 
men's services on his residence were not acts of moral turpi-
tude or unethical conduct. Conclusions of Law, 1f 3, R. 108. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Defendant asserts on appeal that there was not 
adequate evidence in the record to support the trial court's 
Finding of Fact that Donna Hagblom was not required by the 
plaintiff to "kick back" monies to him from her bonus checks. 
The standard of review for such an argument is that a trial 
court's Findings of Fact will be presumed to be correct, and 
will not be overturned, as long as they are adequately sup-
ported by the evidence in the record. Both plaintiff and a 
witness for the plaintiff, Frank Rotunno, testified at length 
that plaintiff did not request any monies from Donna Hagblom as 
a kick back from bonuses that he had given to her from defen-
dant's funds. In fact, Hagblom herself testified that she 
wasn't certain if Rotunno or the plaintiff asked her to return 
monies from her bonus checks. 
II. The plaintiff's request of maintenance services 
upon his personal residence from defendant's employees was not 
an act of moral turpitude or unethical conduct. The defendant 
at first analogizes plaintiff's request to a "theft of ser-
vices" crime, and then assumes that plaintiff in fact committed 
such a crime. Defendant then argues that the commission of 
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such a crime is an act of moral turpitude and unethical 
conduct. Defendant put on no evidence at trial with regard to 
plaintiff's actions fulfilling the elements of the crime of 
theft of services. Because it was not an issue at the trial 
level, the plaintiff put on no evidence with regard to his 
reasons for requesting the services from defendant's employees, 
for example that he thought he was entitled to them or that he 
thought the defendant would not mind his use of the employees 
for such a small amount of time. Notwithstanding defendant's 
attempt to characterize plaintiff's acts as criminal in nature, 
when examined in and of themselves, the actions do not rise to 
the level of moral turpitude or unethical conduct, as defined 
in the treatises and case law. 
III. The trial court did not err in denying defen-
dant's motion for a new trial. The basis for defendant's claim 
of error is that the trial court allegedly failed to consider 
testimony by Donna Hagblom and Annie Laurie Baker that plain-
tiff required Hagblom to return some of the monies from her 
bonuses to him. This claim is without foundation in the 
record. Clearly the trial court did consider such testimony, 
but found plaintiff's testimony and rebuttal more persuasive, 
because the trial court made a specific finding of fact that 
plaintiff did not require Hagblom to return those monies to him. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The record adequately supports the trial court's 
finding that plaintiff did not require Donna 
Hagblom to give monies from her bonus checks to 
plaintiff• 
A. Standard of Review of Sufficiency of 
Evidence Underlying Findings of Fact. 
It is well established that a trial court's Find-
ings of Fact will be presumed to be correct, and will not be 
overturned, as long as they are adequately supported by the 
evidence in the record. Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping 
Company, 15 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 37 (1985)x. On appeal, the 
evidence in the record, and all inferences that might reason-
ably be drawn therefrom, will be viewed in a light most 
favorable to the judgment entered. Hal Taylor Associates v. 
Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 747 (Utah 1982); Nielsen v. 
Chin - Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1980). It is not 
the prerogative of the appellate court to determine whether the 
1. In footnote 2 of the Wessel opinion, the court 
noted that previous cases held the standard for determining the 
sufficiency of the evidence necessary to sustain a finding to 
be whether the evidence was "substantial." The court then 
distinguished between the standard of review of a jury's find-
ings and a judge's findings, and concluded that a slightly 
broader standard of review for the findings of a judge, that of 
"adequate evidence," is appropriate. 
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evidence preponderated on one side or the other. The appellate 
court will only determine whether the evidence in the record 
adequately supports the lower court ruling. Reimschiissel v. 
Russell, 649 P.2d 26, 27 (Utah 1982). 
In a case recently decided by the Utah Supreme Court, 
the appellant challenged the trial court's Findings of Fact in 
an almost identical manner to defendant's instant appeal. The 
appellant presented its argument based upon the facts as it had 
presented them at trial, rather than upon the trial court's 
findings. The Utah Supreme Court stated that in order to 
attack Findings of Fact, an appellant must first marshal all 
the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing it in the light most favorable 
to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings. Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985). In the Scharf case, the appellant had not presented 
evidence supporting his version of the facts, much less the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings. In the instant 
case, the defendant has presented some evidence on the record 
supporting its version of the facts, but has failed to 
enlighten the court as to the extensive evidence supporting the 
trial court's findings. 
B. Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Finding of 
Fact 
The defendant argues that uncontroverted evidence at 
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trial supports a finding that the plaintiff required Donna 
Hagblom to "kickback" some of her bonus money to him. The 
court found otherwise, and had substantial reason to so find. 
During defendant's cross-examination of Frank Rotunno, 
a former employee at Willow Creek Country Club, Rotunno testi-
fied about a bonus he received from the plaintiff, and about 
the monies from that bonus that he voluntarily returned to the 
plaintiff: 
A: I said I received a part of a $600 
bonus for the Utah Open. A part of it. 
Q: A part of it? 
A: Yes. 
Q: How much did you receive? 
A: $300. 
Q: Mr. Rotunno, at the time you 
received that bonus of $300 did you keep the 
full amount? 
A: No sir. 
Q: What happened to the proceeds of 
the check? 
A: I gave with consent from another 
party working at the club $100 to Mr. Jerry 
Aarts. 
Q: Who was the other party working at 
the club you are talking about? 
A: I believe the young lady over there 
in the sort of dark blue suit. (Indicat-
ing). [Mr. Rotunno pointed to Donna 
Hagblom.] 
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Q: Why did you return $100 of the $300 
to Mr. Aarts? 
A: When I received the $300 bonus I 
asked Mr. Aarts if he was going to take any 
part of it. He said "no." I said "well, I 
don't think it's right." So I then went to 
this young lady and told her the situation 
and said, "I think we ought to give Jerry 
some money." That is my doing, and Mr. 
Aarts knew nothing about it and refused it. 
Q: Your testimony is that he refused 
the $100? 
A: The first time, yes, sir. I 
insisted he take it and left it on the desk, 
my money and her money. We gave $100 apiece 
and that was at my suggestion, and my 
suggestion only. Mr. Aarts knew nothing 
about it nor did she until I talked to her. 
Q: In other words, this was just a 
gratuity on your part? 
A: Just a nice gesture. He gave me, 
and I gave in return. 
Q: With respect to these living 
expenses and — 
A: I would like to make a note, sir, 
that when I approached the young lady and I 
said to her, "I think we ought to give him 
$100 apiece," I also said that it would be 
very good for her because I thought that 
when I left she would become the assistant 
manager, and she then gave me the $100. 
Q: It's your testimony that she gave 
you an additional $100? 
A: She gave me $100 of the $300. 
Q: You in turn gave those funds to Mr. 
Aarts? 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes, I did. 
You did that as a gratuity? 
I gave that as a gesture. 
A gesture of what? 
Yes, sir. 
Of what? 
Of appreciation. 
And you were well paid, were you 
not, for your work at Willow Creek Country 
Club. 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Why did you feel that you should 
have to give Mr. Aarts anything? 
A: I didn't feel I had to give Mr. 
Aarts anything. 
R. 189-192. 
Defendant noted in its brief that Donna Hagblom 
testified of meetings with Jerry Aarts and Frank Rotunno where 
she was required to return some monies from her bonus checks to 
the plaintiff. R. 232-238. However, what the defendant did 
not note was Hagblom1s testimony regarding her fuzzy memory 
about these meetings. 
Q: [By Mr. Oritt] . Okay. Now, when 
you testified about this meeting between you 
and Jerry Aarts and Frank Rotunno you said 
that they said to keep quiet about it. Do 
you recall who said it, if Jerry said it or 
if Frank said it? Do you remember which one? 
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A: I really, truly don't remember 
which one. 
Q: So it could have been Frank who 
said don't you think you should give over 
some of this money to Jerry? 
A: Could have been. 
R. 238. 
In rebuttal testimony, the plaintiff testified with 
regard to meetings with Donna Hagblom concerning her bonuses. 
Q: [By Mr. Oritt]. Directing your 
attention to the testimony of Mrs. Hagblom 
earlier today, tell me, Mr. Aarts, why did 
you give bonuses to Mr. Rotunno and Mrs. 
Hagblom after the Utah Open in 1982? 
A: It wasn't only Donna Hagblom and 
Frank Rotunno. There was a dozen or so 
employees that had worked above and beyond. 
We put in a lot of hours. I think we 
averaged about 70 hours each that week 
setting up the stands outside and breaking 
them down. The staff that is normally not 
on that gratuity fund, the service person-
nel, say the bus boys and waiters and 
waitresses, bartenders, I distributed a 
portion of that fund to these people and the 
people in the office. We had a girl stand 
on the golf course to check the cash from 
the office. Annie Laurie was picking up the 
cash. 
Q: It was a pretty big event, wasn't 
it? 
A: Yes, it was. Sharon Luhse was on 
the snack bar and sold sandwiches at the 
tee, and we had this money left over in the 
gratuity fund and that's how we distributed 
it. 
Q: What kind of hours did you keep 
during that event? 
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A: Same amount of hours, 70. 
Q: 70 hours? 
A: Something like that. 
Q: Now, with reference to Mrs. 
Hagblom's testimony being required to give 
some of her money back after the Utah Open, 
do you recall any meeting between you and 
Frank Rotunno and Mrs. Hagblom about the 
bonuses? 
A: I recall a meeting where I gave 
them each a $300 check and then I believe 
Frank imposed whether in my presence or not 
in my presence, Frank said to Donna . . . 
Q: Mr. Aarts, do you recall where this 
meeting took place? 
A: No, I do not. 
Q: All right. Do you recall who was 
at the meeting? 
A: Myself, Donna and Frank. 
Q: And — and — okay. Let's take 
this a step at a time. What did you first 
do with the bonus checks? 
A: I gave them each a $300 check. 
Q: What happened next? 
A: The meeting broke and I think Frank 
came back to me and he said, "I spoke to 
Donna, and we want you to have this." I 
said, "Frank, I don't want any part of it." 
He said, "no. Donna and I got together and 
we feel you should have some of this." 
Q: What did he give you? 
A: $100 from Frank and $100 from Donna. 
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Q: All right. Mrs. Hagblom also 
testified about you requiring some money 
back from a Christmas bonus. Do you have 
any recollection of that? 
A: No sir. 
Q: Did that ever happen? 
A: No sir. 
Q: Do you recall giving her a 
Christmas bonus? 
A: I gave her not a bonus. I gave her 
extra money above and beyond because she 
worked very hard over the holidays, during 
the, you know, Lights On Season and parties 
and so forth. I gave her a bonus for that. 
I gave her extra compensation. 
Q: Did you ever ask her to give any of 
that back? 
A: No sir. 
R. 266-269. 
Frank Rotunno was recalled by the plaintiff as a 
rebuttal witness, subsequent to Mrs. Hagblom's testimony. Mr. 
Rotunno testified, on direct examination and cross-examination, 
that a meeting between Jerry Aarts, Frank Rotunno and Donna 
Hagblom, to which Mrs. Hagblom testified, never took place. He 
testified that he spoke with Mrs. Hagblom outside of plain-
tiff's presence and discussed returning some of their bonus 
monies to him, and that she voluntarily agreed to do so. R. 
274-278. 
In short, plaintiff put on a substantial amount of 
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evidence by which the trial court could find, and in fact did 
find, that Hagblom had voluntarily returned some of her bonus 
money to the plaintiff, and that she was not required to do so 
by the plaintiff. The defendant, however, ignores the substan-
tial evidence rebutting its witness' testimony and assumes, for 
purposes of its brief, that Donna Hagblom was required to "kick 
back" monies from her bonuses to the plaintiff. Defendant then 
argues that such a "kickback" is an act of moral turpitude. 
The court need not determine whether such a "kickback" would be 
an act of moral turpitude. There is adequate evidence, indeed 
substantial evidence, in the record to support the trial 
court's Finding of Fact regarding monies given back by Donna 
Hagblom to the plaintiff, and therefore the trial court's 
finding must be upheld. 
II. Plaintiff's request of maintenance services from 
defendant's employees was not an act of moral 
turpitude. 
The trial court found that plaintiff requested 
maintenance services on his personal residence from two of 
defendant's employees, Kevin Stewart and Stephen Draper. 
Stewart provided 12 hours of service at the plaintiff's 
residence over the course of plaintiff's two and one-half years 
of employment by the defendant. Draper provided 2 hours of 
service at the plaintiff's residence during that time. The 
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trial court ruled that, since the men were on duty for the 
defendant when they worked for the plaintiff, plaintiff should 
reimburse the club the fair market value of the maintenance 
men's services, plus transportation costs, totalling $105. 
Findings of Fact, 1f1f 11, 13, R. 105-106; Conclusions of Law, 
ir 4, R. 108-109. 
As with its argument regarding Donna Hagblom's alleged 
"kickbacks", the defendant here attempts a boot-strapping argu-
ment in order to persuade this Court that plaintiff's acts rise 
to the level of moral turpitude. The defendant argues that, 
because the plaintiff improperly requested services from 
defendant's maintenance men for his personal use, he ;is guilty 
of theft of services, which is per force an act of moral turpi-
tude. But defendant's argument fails because the assumption 
upon which it is based is incorrect. The trial court did not 
rule as a matter of law that plaintiff's use of defendant's 
maintenance men was a theft of services. 
Defendant did not put on evidence at the trial level 
fulfilling the elements of the crime of theft of services. 
Notably lacking in the record is any evidence of the intent of 
the plaintiff to deprive the defendant of services. Theft of 
services is a specific intent crime. The prosecution must 
prove that the accused had the intent to deprive the rightful 
owner of the services. The accused can defend the charge by 
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claiming that he either acted in the honest belief that he had 
the right to obtain or exercise control over the services as he 
did, or that he obtained or exercised control over the services 
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have con-
sented. § 76-6-402(3) (b) and (c), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended). Had the defendant presented evidence as to the issue 
of theft of services in this case, the plaintiff could have 
responded, defending his actions, and the court would have made 
the requisite Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In-
stead, defendant assumes on appeal that plaintiff's actions are 
a theft of services and are "malum in se", that is, an act that 
is evil in itself, like murder, rape, or kidnapping. However, 
"malum in se" crimes require only general intent, not specific 
intent. In crimes such as those, and not in specific intent 
crimes like theft of services, a person is presumed to intend 
the natural consequences of his act which can be inferred from 
the words and conduct of the actor. Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 
367, 369-370 (Utah 1978). 
Clearly, theft of services is not a "malum in se" 
crime, and, therefore, the defendant must prove plaintiff's 
specific intent to commit theft of services, in order to argue 
that his actions in asking defendant's maintenance men to 
perform some maintenance work on his personal residence rise to 
the level of moral turpitude. 
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The Court must determine on appeal if plaintiff's 
request for services by defendant's maintenance men on his 
residence, while they were on duty for defendant, was an act of 
moral turpitude. An act of moral turpitude has been defined as 
An act of baseness, vileness or depravity in 
the private and social duties which a man 
owes to his fellowmen or to society in 
general, contrary to the accepted and custo-
mary rule of right and duty between man and 
man. 
United States v. Smith, 420 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1160 (Rev. 4th Ed. 1957)). 
There is little case law clarifying the definition of 
moral turpitude. In the context of deportation of aliens, acts 
of moral turpitude have included bigamy, breaking and entering, 
burglary, carnal knowledge of females under the age of consent, 
counterfeiting, forgery, lewdness, manslaughter in the first 
degree, rape and robbery. CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, Aliens, 
§ 94(d)(7) at 720. In a lawyer discipline case, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court concluded that "moral turpitude" implied some-
thing immoral in and of itself, regardless of whether the 
behavior decried as an act of moral turpitude was punishable by 
law. State ex rel Oklahoma Bar Association v. Denton, 598 P.2d 
663, 664 (Okla. 1979). 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that, where the 
issue before it is one of law, it is not bound by the conclu-
sions of the trial court and may determine the question. 
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Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587, n.l (Utah 1982). Accord, 
Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d at 1070 (Utah 1985). The 
trial court concluded that plaintiff's actions were not acts of 
moral turpitude. Conclusions of Law, 1[ 3, R. 108. Plaintiff 
submits that plaintiff's acts in requesting the services of 
defendant's maintenance men for his personal residence cer-
tainly did not rise to the level of ". . .an act of baseness, 
vileness or depravity . . .M. Perhaps plaintiff's actions were 
ill-advised, and he should have checked with the defendant to 
determine if he could utilize defendant's maintenance men for 
the brief period of time that he did. But, as a matter of law, 
plaintiff's actions were not acts of moral turpitude, and the 
trial court's conclusion of law to that effect should be 
affirmed. 
Ill. The trial court did not err in denying 
defendant's Motion for a new trial. 
Defendant claims that the court failed to consider 
testimony by Donna Hagblom and Annie Laurie Baker that 
plaintiff required that Hagblom return some of the monies from 
her bonuses to him. Defendant then argues that, because the 
court refused to consider its testimony to that end, it's 
denial of defendant's Motion for a new trial is error. 
The trial court specifically found that there was no 
evidence preponderating to defendant's benefit that Hagblom was 
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required to return some monies from her bonuses in cash to the 
plaintiff. Findings of Fact, 1f 17, R. 108. Furthermore, as 
set forth earlier in this Brief, there was substantial testi-
mony by the plaintiff and by Frank Rotunno that directly 
controverted the testimony of Donna Hagblom and Annie Laurie 
Baker. 
Under the very cases defendant cites in its Brief that 
set forth the standard for reversing a trial court's denial of 
a Motion for a new trial if "the evidence to support the 
verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvinc-
ing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust," 
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982), the trial 
court's denial of the defendant's Motion for a new trial should 
be affirmed, as there was substantial evidence to support its 
verdict. 
IV. Plaintiff's request of services from defendant's 
maintenance men does not rise to the level of 
unethical conduct. 
The trial court found that Donna Hagblom was not 
required by the plaintiff to return any monies to plaintiff 
from her bonuses, thus leaving the only action of plaintiff 
that defendant alleges is unethical to be his request for, and 
receipt of, services from defendant's maintenance men on his 
personal residence. 
Defendant argues that the trial court's order of an 
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offset of $105, to be paid by plaintiff to the defendant for 
the services of defendant's maintenance men, implies a legal 
conclusion that plaintiff's actions were unethical. Contrar-
ily, the trial court specifically concluded that those actions 
did not rise to the level of unethical conduct. The defendant 
again analogizes to theft of services, and tries to boot-strap 
its assumption that plaintiff's actions were theft of services 
into a legal argument that, because plaintiff committed theft 
of services, he is guilty of unethical conduct. Once again, 
defendant's argument fails because the assumption that there 
was a theft is incorrect. The court made no such finding or 
conclusion. 
There is even less case law or discussion in treatises 
about unethical conduct than about acts of moral turpitude. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines unethical conduct as: "Conduct 
not according to business or professional standards." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1698 (Rev. 4th Ed. 1968). There was no evidence 
put on by either side at the trial level as to professional 
standards of private club managers. The trial court concluded, 
as a matter of law, that plaintiff's actions in utilizing 
defendant's maintenance men for a few hours on his personal 
residence were not unethical. Plaintiff submits that, while 
plaintiff's actions were perhaps ill-advised, certainly his 
actions were not unethical. 
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V. Costs and Attorney's Fees 
The trial court awarded the plaintiff the costs and 
attorney's fees he incurred in enforcing the Employment 
Agreement, pursuant to 1f 3 of the Employment Agreement. R. 3. 
Plaintiff prays at this time for an Order by this Court award-
ing him his costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending 
this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
There is more than adequate evidence in the record to 
support the trial court's Finding of Fact that Donna Hagblom 
was not required by the plaintiff to "kick back" monies from 
her bonus to him. The trial court made a specific Finding of 
Fact on that issue, thereby supporting its denial of defen-
dant's motion for a new trial. 
The only act of the plaintiff that defendant can ask 
this Court to review in the context of legal standards for acts 
of moral turpitude and unethical conduct is plaintiff's request 
of services upon his personal residence from defendant's main-
tenance men. The trial court found that plaintiff's request 
was not an act of moral turpitude or unethical conduct, and 
merely ordered him to compensate defendant for the fair market 
value of the services of defendant's employees, plus their 
transportation costs. Given the prevailing legal definitions 
of acts of motal turpitude and unethical conduct, the trial 
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court's Conclusion of Law that plaintiff's acts did not rise to 
the level of unethical conduct or acts of moral turpitude must 
be affirmed. 
Accordingly, plaintiff urges that the trial court's 
Judgment be affirmed on all issues of fact and law. Plaintiff 
also urges this Court to award him his costs and attorney's 
fees incurred in defending,this appeal. 
DATED this // ' day of November, 1985. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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